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1. Local consequences of globalization: upgrading or polarization? 
 
 
In both the academic and political debate on globalization, inequality is undoubtedly the 
most disputed theme (cf. Dicken, 2003; Held & McGrew, 2000). This is also true in the 
field of urban studies, especially in the debate on global cities, where much attention has 
been paid to the local social effects of globalization. Two opposing views have been 
brought forward. One states that the globalization of urban economies results in 
increasing local inequality and even social polarization (cf. Sassen, 1991, 2001; 
Friedmann & Wolff, 1982; Friedmann, 1986). The other states that globalization of urban 
economies leads to an upgrading of metropolitan labor-markets (cf. Hamnett, 1994; 1996; 
Waldinger, 1996). The debate on this issue has been going on for some time now and is 
still not brought to a conclusion. Empirical data has been presented that, allegedly, 
corroborates either one of both theoretical positions. This paper is based on the argument 
that the main reason for this empirical deadlock is the result of interrelated theoretical 
and operational ambiguities. 
 
The first ambiguity concerns the role of international competition. In the economic 
literature on globalization, in which countries and not cities are the units of analysis, the 
dominant argument is that globalization leads to upgrading labor-markets in the advanced 
economies (Dicken, 2003). The main line of reasoning here is that in order to maintain 
their competitive edge, advanced economies have to cut on labor costs by automation or 
else increase the quality of their products. Either way, globalization – in the sense of 
increasing international economic exposure – leads to upgrading national labor-markets. 
This is in line with what some authors have argued as to how urban labor-markets are 
developing (Hamnett, 1994; 1996; Waldinger, 1996). But global cities might be an 
exception here because one of the key characteristics of global cities is that global cities 
do not compete so much with other cities but, rather, form a limited set of strategically 
cooperating cities (Sassen, 1991; 2001). So, at least theoretically, polarization in global 
cities is not necessarily incompatible with the general argument of increasing 
international competition leading to upgrading labor-markets. Before assessing social 
inequality, one should therefore analyze the international exposure of urban economies. 
The second ambiguity concerns the conceptualization of the global character of an urban 
economy. In many cases – prominently so in the work of Sassen (1991, 2001) – 
globalization is operationally conceived of as, or at least directly related to ‘economic 
restructuring’: the increasing employment in services and the decreasing employment in 
manufacturing industries. For global cities, economic restructuring to a large degree may 
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be the result of their specific role in the world economy. But there is a broad consensus 
that economic restructuring in general is not caused by globalization but, rather, by 
changes in (national) demand and technological developments (cf. Krugman, 1994; 1996; 
Krugman & Lawrence, 1994). Therefore, one should differentiate between globalization 
and economic restructuring instead of equating them in order to assess the local effects 
of globalization. Potentially at least, they have different effects.The third ambiguity 
relates to the question of agency. The globalization of urban economies is not brought 
about by cities so much, but by the firms and enterprises settled there (cf. Taylor, 2004). 
In other words, when it comes to globalization, one should analyze firms and companies, 
not cities as such. Studying urban labor-markets in general means that one does not 
differentiate between global and non-global economic activities. Even in global cities, 
there are substantial parts of the urban economy that are not internationally operating or 
orientated. As Sassen (2006b: x) has argued, the “…global city is not a descriptive term 
meant to capture a whole city”. By using employers and firms as units of analysis one can 
differentiate between global and non-global economic activities. By doing so, one can 
directly relate the international character and involvement of different forms of 
employment to the consequences for social inequality in terms of wage-levels. 
 
Using data on the Dutch cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam we will assess the local 
effects of globalization on social equality. We will do so by using data on social 
inequality collected at the appropriate level, i.e. firms and employers and not cities in 
general. We distinguish between a global city (Amsterdam) and a non-global city 
(Rotterdam). We will analyze and differentiate between the effects of global city 
formation, international exposure and economic restructuring on social inequality. In 
section 2 we will derive eight propositions from the discussion on the global city thesis 
that will guide us through our analyses on firms and employers in Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam. In section 3, we describe the dataset we used and test our hypotheses by 
means of multiple regression analyses. Section 4 concludes with our main findings and 
suggestions for further research. 
  
 
2. Globalization and Urban Inequality: Eight Basic Propositions 
 
 
Global cities have been conceived of as part of a new geography, related to the most 
recent phase in the internationalization of the economy (Sassen, 2000; 2001; 2006a). 
According to global city theory, the international division of labor is a process of 
centralized decentralization, where global cities are the organizing centers. Basically, 
global cities form a web spun by the headquarters of transnational corporations situated 
there. In this web, global cities complement each other and, paradoxically, do not suffer 
from the global competition they themselves induce. Worldwide, there are ‘about forty’ 
of those global cities (Sassen, 2006a: 315). Besides empirically mapping worldwide 
hierarchies of cities, research addressing the global city thesis has particularly focused on 
the issue of social polarization, as we stated before. 
In global city theory, social polarization is related to the specific coordinating economic 
role of those cities. The main economic force in global cities is a limited number of 
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rapidly growing sectors, more specifically corporate headquarters, but also advanced 
producer services such as international finance, accountancy and law firms, and the 
consumer functions that cater to the highly skilled knowledge workers in those cities. In 
general, the service sector has both a higher share of low-income and high-income 
employees than the traditional manufacturing sector. Contrary to the industrial era in 
which historically the share of middle-income employees has been constantly expanding, 
global city theory predicts a growing share of both low-income and high-income 
employees and therefore can be conceived of as ‘the theory of the declining middle’. 
 
In the actual practice of empirical research on the issue of polarization, the concept of the 
global city has in many cases been used as a heuristic category in the sense that the global 
city serves as a model that is tested in research on inequality in cities in general. Sassen, 
the very founder of the concept, herself has contributed to the confusion as to the status 
of the concept of the global city as either an essentialist ‘thing’ – which is suggested by 
her claim that there are ‘about 40’ global cities (Sassen, 2006a: 315) – or the global city 
as a heuristic ‘device’: “…an analytical construct [our italics, JB/JvdW] that allows one 
to detect the global as it is filtered through the specifics of a place….” (Sassen, 2006b: x). 
This is an important distinction because by using the global city as a heuristic concept – 
which, we would argue, is the regular practice in the field of urban studies – one loses 
track of the effect of international competition on social inequality. This is highly 
problematic, because international competition is a key variable in the economic 
literature on globalization and wage inequality. The main argument here is that increasing 
international competition leads to an upgrading of the job and wage structure in advanced 
economies. An increasingly knowledge-based and technologically innovative production, 
needed to stay ahead of low-wage countries, is seen as the main cause of this upgrading 
(Dicken, 2003). Hence if, as global city theory claims, global cities form a distinct set of 
basically not competing but, rather, strategically collaborating cities, their social structure 
may not be paradigmatic for other, i.e. non-global, cities that experience international 
competition – as most cities do. As a consequence, global cities may have a social 
structure that is different from non-global cities (polarizing vs. upgrading labor-markets, 
respectively). This means that, in assessing the urban social consequences of 
globalization, it is essential to differentiate between global and non-global cities instead 
of using global city theory as a paradigm for cities in general. 
 
Although Sassen (2001: 350, 351) specifically has argued that global city functions do 
not comprise all economic activity in global cities, research nonetheless tends to 
addresses all jobs in cities (see for this research practice, inter alia Baum, 1997; Baum, 
1999; Hamnett, 1994; Hamnett, 1996; Tai, 2006; Walks, 2001). This is not surprising 
because the logic of global city theory of how polarization exactly comes about focuses, 
as we stated before, on characteristics of the emerging service economy.  Commercial 
services are especially characterized by both high and low-income jobs, and these 
services are important and maybe even decisive in terms of what makes a city a global 
city. In Sassen’s analysis, much of what she has to say about the labor-market 
characteristics of global cities is essentially derived from the service character of those 
cities. But the point is that the transition from a manufacturing or industrial economy to a 
service economy is a general phenomenon in advanced economies and not restricted to 
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global cities. Although economic restructurering in global cities to a large extent may 
indeed be induced by their coordinating role in the world economy – the headquarters of 
transnational corporations situated there and all the services catering to these corporations 
and their highly skilled and highly paid professional workers – economic restructurering 
outside global cities cannot be explained by globalization, but is mainly brought about by 
technological innovation and changing national demand, as we stated before (cf. 
Krugman, 1994; 1996; Krugman & Lawrence, 1994). So, if economic restructuring 
would only cause polarization in global cities, this then could be entirely ascribed to 
globalization. However, if both global and non-global cities would experience polarizing 
tendencies because of economic restructuring, globalization cannot be the explanation of 
this phenomenon. So, comparing the social consequences of economic restructuring in a 
global city to that in a non-global city can shed light on this matter. 
 
The only way to distinguish empirically between international exposure and economic 
restructuring in terms of their effects on social inequality is to analyze firms and 
employers in cities instead of urban labor-markets in general. Only at that level is one 
able to differentiate between international exposure and the sectorial structure of an urban 
economy. Doing so, one solves an important general problem of global city theory: that 
of the agency of global cities. 
In a convincing critique of the major formulations of the global city thesis, Taylor (2004) 
has argued that most assertions about the nature and social makeup of global cities at 
closer scrutiny are not really empirically substantiated – Short et al’s (1996) ‘dirty little 
secret’ of the theory on global cities. Most of the data used in the important theoretical 
statements are, at best, illustrations rather than empirical proof of the global city thesis 
because the data used does not really relate to the central concepts. According to Taylor 
(2004), cities become part of international networks through the agency of the 
corporations located in those cities. We not only firmly agree with Taylor’s line of 
reasoning, but want to carry his argument even one step further and argue that if one aims 
at assessing the social consequences of globalization one should assess firms and 
employers and not cities. 
 
Recapturing our arguments thus far, we can formulate eight rather straightforward 
propositions, which, taken together, not only unravel the complicated theoretical 
arguments in global city theory, but also can also decide the debate on globalization and 
urban inequality: 
 
1) Global cities experience less international competition than non-global cities; 
2) This is caused by their different sectorial composition in comparison to non-
global cities. Steering the global economy and facilitating that process leads to 
a disproportionate share of commercial services in global cities. 
3) Due to these steering and facilitating functions, commercial services in global 
cities experience less international competition than commercial services in 
non-global cities. 
4) Global cities have a more polarized wage-structure than non-global cities. In 
non-global cities, exposed to international competition as they are, one finds 
upgrading tendencies. 
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5) The polarized wage structure in global cities is caused by the greater share of 
commercial services compared to non-global cities. 
6) And by a more polarized wage structure of the commercial services in global 
cities in comparison to those in non-global cities. Commercial services in 
global cities comprise first and foremost their global functions and the 
functions that facilitate them. 
7) Since non-global cities are exposed to international competition, they 
experience upgrading tendencies. The polarized wage structure of global cities 
comprises a large share of low-income employees. Therefore non-global cities 
should have a relatively upgraded wage-structure in comparison to global 
cities. 
8) This relatively upgraded wage-structure in non-global cities is caused by 
exposure to international competition. 
 
We will put these propositions to the test by looking at the two main cities of the 
Netherlands, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Both cities are within the same institutional 
context of the Dutch welfare-state and therefore we control for differences between 
welfare-state regimes, which is an important variable as it comes to (urban) wage 
inequality (cf. Burgers & Musterd, 2002; Vaattovaara & Kortteinen, 2003). 
In our analysis, we will use Amsterdam as a global city and Rotterdam as a non-global 
city – or at least Amsterdam being much closer to the ideal/typical global city than 
Rotterdam. In fact, Amsterdam has been qualified as a global city by the very founder of 
the concept (Sassen, 1991; 2000; 2001; 2006a), and has been labeled a ‘gamma world 
city’ – indicating a high world city status – by Taylor (2004), because of the high inter-
city connectivity of its advanced producer services. Rotterdam, on the other hand, has 
never been mentioned as a part of the web of global cities, and scores much lower on the 
inter-city connectivity of its advanced producer services than Amsterdam – 75th on a 
world scale compared to 12th for Amsterdam (Taylor, 2004). Clearly, only Amsterdam 
belongs to one of the ‘about forty’ cities Sassen labeled as ‘global’ in her most recent 
study (2006a: 315). 
 
By using data on employers – see next section – based in Amsterdam and Rotterdam we 
overcome the problem of agency that, as we have seen, is so central in much global city 
research. Our data makes it possible to assess international competition instead of 
assuming it, and they allow for disentangling the effects of international exposure and 
economic restructurering on social inequality. 
 
3. Data & Operationalization 
 
Our analyses are based on the Dutch biannual ‘OSA-labour demand panel’ which started 
in 1989. The OSA Employers’ survey is designed to allow more insight into the nature 
and size of demand for labor by organizations, as well as more particular factors 
concerning the demand for labor at establishment level. The organizations are asked for 
detailed information concerning their product, production processes, the technologies 
used, their personnel, personnel policy and diverse financial and economic indicators.i 
 6
The panel consists of a random sample survey of companies with more than five 
employees.  
Data are gathered by written questionnaires and interviews, both face-to-face and by 
telephone. Because many companies drop out every new round of data collection, in 
every ‘wave’ new companies are randomly selected to complete the sample. 
We will only use data of companies settled in the agglomerations of Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam.ii In order to get a substantial number of cases within those urban regions, we 
used five different waves of data collection – 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003 – and 
combined them to one dataset. In doing so, we maximize the number of companies, 
without including companies more than once.iii 
 
Dependent variablesiv – in order to rank companies in terms of to what degree they are 
part of the international economy we used two variables. The first is the percentage of 
returns realized by exports. The second is a dichotomy, indicating whether companies 
experience foreign competition or not. These two variables are standardized and as such 
combined in a new variable international exposurev: a scale indicating the average score 
on the two constituting variables. 
 In each volume of the survey, companies were asked for the percentage of employees per 
income category. Each volume used either seven or eight income categories. The lowest 
income category is used for the variable percentage of low-income employees.vi   
The construction of the variable polarization needs some elaboration. The notion of 
polarization has been defined as the thesis of ‘the declining middle’: the middle-income 
stratum gets smaller while the low-income and high-income stratums both increase.. If 
they would not both increase , it would either be a case of upgrading – the high-income 
stratum grows while the low-income stratum does not – or downgrading – the low-
income stratum grows while the high-income stratum does not. To measure polarization 
we used the mean pair distant coefficient.vii This coefficient is able to measure income 
inequality in the form of pure polarization, that is leaving upgrading and downgrading 
out, which most measures of inequality fail to do. As such, it is the best indicator for 
testing the theory of the declining middle. 
Independent variables – to compare Amsterdam and Rotterdam, we created a dummy 
variable city dummy coding Amsterdam as 1 and Rotterdam as 2. For the assessment of 
the consequences of the differing sectorial composition of, and the differing composition 
of sectors between, these cities we constructed economic sector dummies: Industry, 
Commercial services and Non-commercial services. The social consequences of 
international exposure will be assessed by using the variable international exposure as 
described above. 
Control variables – we will use year as control variable because, as stated above, the data 
contain volumes of different years, while most of the time we do not measure the effect 
of the course of time. We also use company size – the number of employees – as a control 
variable. The categories ‘5-10’, ‘10-20’, ‘20-50’, ‘50-100’, ‘100-500’ and ‘more than 500 
employees’ have been recoded from 1 trough 6 respectively. The open character of the 
last category and the large range of the last, but one, category made us decide to ‘reduce’ 
this variable to a quasi interval level, instead of assuming means for each category. 
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4. Globalization and Urban Inequality: Testing the Propositions  
 
First, we check whether Amsterdam and Rotterdam do differ in the extent to which their 
companies are exposed to the international economy. In order to do so, we regressed the 
city dummy on international exposure (model 1, table 1). The coefficient of the city 
dummy is positive and significant. Since Amsterdam is coded as one, and Rotterdam is 
coded as two, this means – consistent with the global city-theory – companies in 
Rotterdam are more exposed to the international economy than companies in Amsterdam, 
confirming hypothesis 1.  
According to the global city-theory, the difference in exposure to international 
competition between Amsterdam and Rotterdam’s companies should be the result of a 
difference in the sectorial composition of their economies. To assess this assumption we 
entered dummies for the manufacturing industrial sector and the commercial services 
 
Table 1: Regression analyses. Dependent variable is international exposure. (Method: Ordinary 
Least Squares).  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent variables    
 
β Β β 
City dummy (Rotterdam) 0.067* 0.047 0.049 
Manufacturing    0.352*** 0.347*** 
Commercial services  0.316*** 0.318*** 
Non commercial services (ref.)  0 0 
Industry x Rotterdam   0.059* 
Commercial services x Rotterdam   0.034 
 
 
  
Control    
Company size 0.158*** 0.189*** 0.190*** 
    
R² 0.030 0.141 0.142 
N 1305 1305 1305 
*p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001   
Analyses of the OSA labour demand panels 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001and 2003 with companies based in the 
COROP-areas Amsterdam en Rotterdam. 
 
sector in the analysis (model 2) – the non-commercial services are the reference category. 
Both coefficients are positive and significant – the coefficient of manufacturing 
industries being the stronger one. Since the reference category is non-commercial 
services this is no surprise: non-commercial services are not directly internationally 
exposed. More important, the coefficient of the city dummy is smaller than in model 1, 
and has become statistically insignificant, meaning that the higher exposure to the 
international economy of Rotterdam’s companies can partly be explained by the different 
sectorial makeup of Amsterdam and Rotterdam’s economies – confirming hypothesis 2.  
Since the coefficient of the city dummy has become insignificant in model 2, assessing 
whether the difference in exposure to the international economy between Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam business is partly caused by the different make-up of the same sectors between 
these cities as argued in the ‘global city’-theory (hypothesis 3), is not possible anymore. 
What can be assessed however is whether sectors indeed differ between cities when it 
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comes to exposure to the international economy. Therefore we entered interaction effects 
of the sector dummies with the city dummy (model 3). Both interaction effects are 
positive as expected. Only the interaction effect with the industrial sector is significant: 
companies in the industrial sector in Rotterdam are more exposed to the international 
economy than those in Amsterdam. Although expected, this is not the case for companies 
in the service sector.  
 
In sum, global city-theory proves to be correct when it comes to the relative absence of 
exposure to international competition in global cities. Global city Amsterdam’s economy 
is less exposed to international competition than Rotterdam’s economy. Consistent with 
global city-theory, this is caused by the different economic structure of the two cities. 
This leads to the important conclusion that the use of global city-theory for the 
assessment of the social consequences of globalization in cities in general creates a blind 
spot for the social consequences of international competition. Although international 
competition is extensively theorized in globalization literature at large, it is relatively 
absent in much of the urban studies literature because it does not fit in global city-theory 
which, as we argued before, has dominated if not monopolized empirical research on the 
social consequences of globalization. Essentially, the dominance of global city-arguments 
in research on social inequality in contemporary cities has led to a tunnel vision in which 
the social consequences of international competition have been neglected. Since 
international competition is a core feature of economic globalization, we would argue this 
underassessment is not only hard to justify but, more seriously, may have led to a 
distorted view of the consequences of globalization for most cities’ economies and thus 
the fortunes of their inhabitants. 
Because the social consequences expected to be caused by global city-formation on the 
one hand and international competition on the other differ, recognizing and assessing the 
multidimensionality of globalization is all the more important. Global city formation is 
expected to cause polarizing tendencies whereas increasing international competition is 
expected to cause upgrading.  
An assessment of the social consequences of globalization in western cities should 
therefore not only be aware of the way cities are integrated into the global economy – 
being ‘global’ or ‘non-global’ – and the multidimensional character of economic 
globalization, but also of resulting different social consequences thereof about to be 
assessed.  
 
 
First we checked whether business in Amsterdam differs from that in Rotterdam when it 
comes to the extent of polarization of the income structure (table 2, model 1). Since the 
coefficient of the city dummy is negative and significant, companies in Amsterdam prove 
to have a more polarized income structure that those in Rotterdam, confirming hypothesis 
4. In model 2 we entered the sector dummies to assess whether the differing sector 
distribution is responsible for this difference. In line with global citi- theory, companies 
in the commercial services have a more polarized income structure than those in 
manufacturing. However, this proves not to be the reason of the more polarized income 
structure in Amsterdam’s companies since the coefficient of the city dummy declines only 
marginally. Therefore, hypothesis 5 has to be rejected.  
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Table 2: Regression analyses. Dependent variable is polarization in income distribution. (Method: 
Ordinary Least Squares).  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent variables    
 
β β β 
City dummy (Rotterdam) -0.068* -0.065* -0.072* 
Manufacturing (ref.)  0 0 
Commercial services  0.084* 0.086* 
Non commercial services   -0.121** -0.117** 
International exposure  -0.045 -0.047 
Commercial services X City dummy   -0.010 
Non commercial services X City dummy   -0.055 
 
 
  
Control variables    
Year -0.069* -0.057 -0.059 
Company size -0.052 -0.030 -0.029 
    
R² 0.006 0.033 0.045 
N 612 612 612 
*p< 0.1 ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01; **** p< 0.001   
Analyses of the OSA labour demand panels 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001and 2003 with companies based in the 
COROP-areas Amsterdam en Rotterdam. 
 
In the last model (3) we entered the interaction effects of the sector dummies with the city 
dummy. Both prove to have insignificant β-coefficients leading to the rejection of 
hypothesis 6. Contrary to what one should expect because of their supposed global city 
functions, Amsterdam’s commercial services do not have a more polarized income 
structure than those in Rotterdam.  
 
Summing up, firms in Amsterdam – the global city in our analytical framework – indeed 
show a more polarized income structure that those in Rotterdam. However, ‘global city’ 
arguments paradoxically prove not to be the cause for these polarizing tendencies, since 
hypotheses 5 and 6 have been rejected. Only deindustrialization – the decrease of 
employment in manufacturing industries – leads to polarizing tendencies since companies 
in the commercial services sector have a more polarized income structure than companies 
in the industry sector. Since this goes for both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, it cannot 
explain the more polarized income structure of Amsterdam’s firms and therefore another 
explanation has to be found.  
In the first model in table 3 we checked whether business in the city under scrutiny that is 
exposed to international competition most – Rotterdam – has the lowest share of low-
income  
 
Table 3: Regression analyses. Dependent variable is percentage of low-income employees. (Method: 
Ordinary Least Squares).  
    Model 1  Model 2 
Independent variables      
 
  β  β 
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City dummy (Rotterdam)   0.070* 0.078** 
Industry (ref.)    0 
Commercial services    0.086* 
Non commercial services     -0.128** 
International exposure    -0.135*** 
 
  
  
Control variables     
Year   -0.024 -0.017 
Company size   -0.262**** -0.224**** 
     
R²   0.068 0.105 
N   612 612 
*p< 0.1 ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01; **** p< 0.001     
Analyses of the OSA labour demand panels 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001and 2003 with companies based in the 
COROP-areas Amsterdam en Rotterdam. 
 
employees, as one should expect according to the upgrading logic. The β-coefficient of 
the city dummy in model 1 shows this is not the case. Since it is both positive and 
significant, there are more – not less – low-income employees in Rotterdam business, 
despite its higher exposure to international competition and the more polarized income 
structure of Amsterdam, falsifying hypotheses 7 and 8.  
Although the last hypothesis cannot be corroborated anymore, we still entered 
international exposure and the sector dummies into model 2, to assess their consequences 
for the share of low-income employees within companies and the difference in this share 
between Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Model 3 shows that international exposure indeed 
leads to a lower share of low-income employees within companies, and that companies in 
commercial services have a higher share of low-income employees than those in the 
manufacturing industries. This last finding is not surprising either, since we have seen 
that companies in the commercial services sector are more polarized than those in the 
manufacturing industries and therefore have a higher share of low-income employees. 
The β-coefficient of the city dummy increases in strength: controlled for the higher 
exposure to the international economy, Rotterdam’s business has an even higher level of 
low-income employees.  
 
 
5. Conclusions and Discussion: Global Versus Local Impacts on Social 
Inequality 
 
Our analyses of the relevant actors – firms and employers in cities – show that where it 
comes to international exposure, Amsterdam indeed may be qualified as a global city: 
compared to Rotterdam, Amsterdam’s firms experience a relatively low degree of 
international competition. Also in line with global city-theory is the fact that 
Amsterdam’s firms show a more polarized wage structure than those in Rotterdam. 
However, there is a theoretical problem here because the reasons suggested by global 
city-theory to bring this difference about, actually fail to do so. Neither the different 
sectorial make-up of the two cities, nor the different functions (global vs. non-global) of 
their economies explain the relatively polarized wage structure of Amsterdam compared 
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to Rotterdam. This means that it is essential to test instead of illustrate theoretical 
statements on the urban social consequences of globalization (cf. Short et al., 1996). 
Besides, it is not so much global city formation that leads to polarizing tendencies, but 
economic restructuring in general since Amsterdam and Rotterdam do not differ in this 
respect. 
Exposure to international competition leads to upgrading tendencies that are stronger than 
the polarizing tendencies induced by economic restructuring (compare table 2 and 3). 
Furthermore, the growth of non-commercial services – part of the process of economic 
restructurering – leads to depolarizing tendencies which are stronger than the polarizing 
tendencies of the growing service sector in general (table 2). In the global age non-
commercial local services form a growing share in the economy of both global and non-
global cities in the advanced economies (cf. Persky & Wiewel, 1994). These services are 
part of the institutional make up of national welfare states, and are not related to 
globalization. In short, globalization’s strongest effects on urban wage inequality are the 
upgrading tendencies due to international competition, while polarizing tendencies prove 
to be only partly caused by globalization – the growth of the service sector in a global 
city – and are at least partly cancelled out by the growth of the non-commercial services. 
We would argue that these findings seriously undermine the globalization-polarization 
nexus so dominant in urban studies.  
 
But there is another factor of importance resulting from our analyses. If economic 
restructuring and increasing exposure to international competition would be decisive in 
explaining differences between Amsterdam and Rotterdam one would expect less low-
income workers in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam. But exactly the opposite is true. Most 
probably, the explanation is to be found in the supply-side of the labor-market: the 
Rotterdam labor-force on the average is less educated than the Amsterdam labor-force, as 
Table 4 clearly shows. Where in Amsterdam – and the other main Dutch cities for that 
matterviii – highly skilled jobholders outnumber workers with only basic schooling, in 
Rotterdam the opposite is true. 
 
Table 4. Educational level Amsterdam and Rotterdam labour force. 
 Basic training Academic or 
professional 
training 
Difference Ratio 
Basic/Academic 
or professional 
Amsterdam     
1996 99,000 164,000 +  65,000 0,60 
2002 101,000 202,000 +101,000 0,50 
Rotterdam     
1996 119,000 91,000 - 28,000 1,31 
2002 135,000 115,000 - 20,000 1,17 
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
 
Again, one could argue that non-global processes are more important for urban wage 
inequality than the globalization of the economy. 
 
Our corroboration of the argument that global cities, because of their steering and 
controlling role in the global economy, are not competing as much as other non-global-
cities, implies that using global city theory as a heuristic device for analyzing the 
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consequences of globalization in cities in general, maybe confusing if not outright 
obscuring (cf. McCann, 2004 for a similar argumentation concerning non-social issues). 
By definition, most cities are non-global cities and therefore it makes no sense analyzing 
their socio-economic structure on the basis of global city-arguments. Global city-theory 
sheds no light on those cities, nor can their socio-economic characteristics ever falsify 
global city-theory. Using global city-theory as a model for the analysis of local 
consequences of globalization tout court, leads to a blind spot for the social consequences 
of the increasing exposure to international competition. This, while international 
competition is not only considered to be one of the core features of globalization, but, as 
shown by our analyses, has a stronger impact on wage inequality than global city 
formation.  
 
Furthermore, while using the global city concept as a heuristic device, economic 
restructuring is often seen as induced by or even as a proxy of globalization. 
Subsequently, many studies on the consequences of globalization in actual fact assess the 
consequences of deindustrialization (cf. inter alia: Baum, 1997; Baum, 1999 Tai, 2006; 
Walks, 2001). Analyzing the social consequences of globalization in cities based on 
global city theory is therefore not only obscuring a core feature of globalization as 
international competition, but also overstates the social consequences of globalization for 
many workers in cities in the advanced economies. After all, as argued before, economic 
restructuring in cities with the advanced economies is largely driven by local and national 
processes instead of international or global ones. Our findings indicate that even in the 
global age, local geographical, institutional and historical idiosyncrasies of individual 
cities seem to be decisive in understanding their socio-economic structure (cf. Smith, 
2001).  
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Notes 
                                                 
i
 For more information see: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/osa/datasets/labour_demand_panel.html. 
ii
 More specifically, we use the so-called ‘COROP-area’, which is an urban area based on a nodal 
classification principle. Each COROP-area has a central core (city) with a surrounding area measured by 
relations such as the traffic between place of residence and place of work of urban employees. 
iii
 In the COROP-areas of Amsterdam (12292) and Rotterdam (11826) there are 24118 (12292 + 11826) 
companies with five or more employees (point of meausurement 01-01-2005). This means you have to 
have a sample size of at least 378 for a confidence interval of 5% and a confidence level of 95% for your 
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analyses. This proves to be no obstacle for the anayses in this chapter. Calculated on: 
http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm at 25-10-2006.   
iv
 All variables in the analyses have been standardized. 
v
 A principal component analysis on these two standardized variables gives a first factor that explains 74% 
of the variance. The factor loadings of these variables are both 0,864. A reliability analysis gives 
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0,655. This indicates a reasonable scale. 
vi
 It needs to be emphasized that the volumes do not always use the same category limits. To overcome 
possible invalid research findings because of this we will use year as a control variable (see below). 
vii
 The polarisation index – a mean pair distant coefficient – is calculated as follows:  
polarisation index  = ((((hwc*lwc*(ABS(1-3)) + ((hwc*mwc*(ABS1-2)) + ((mwc*hwc*(ABS(2-1)) + 
((mwc*lwc*(ABS(2-3)) + ((hwc*lwc*(ABS(3-1)) + (lwc*mwc*(ABS(3-2))) / 
((hwc+mwc+lwc)*(hwc+mwc+lwc))). ‘hwc’ indicates ‘high wage category’, ‘mwc’ indicates ‘middle 
wage category’ and ‘lwc’ indicates ‘low wage category’. 
 
